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The ‘political settlement’ concept has been around for 
a long time, but like any smart virus it has morphed 
along the way to suit its various hosts. It appeared first 
and has its widest currency in the international relations 
and peace literature, where it describes a negotiated 
settlement to conflict which spells out how power is 
to be distributed and managed in the post-conflict 
state.1 Its next relevant incarnation, for the purposes 
of this paper, was in the mid-1990s in the writing of 
Mushtaq Khan, who used the concept to challenge the 
explanations offered by new institutional economics for 
state failure in developing countries (Khan 1995). Don’t 
just focus on the institutions, he argues, but look to the 
political settlement. The performance of institutions, 
in his analysis, is determined not only by the form of 
those institutions, but by the way that the inherited 
balance of power or political settlement interacts with 
them. He returned to this theme in later writings, and 
the logic was later taken up by a small band of political 
economists working with think tanks funded by the 
United Kingdom development agency, DFID.
The concept made its debut in development policy 
some 12 years later (Whaites 2007) as policymakers 
wrestled with the central challenge of how to promote 
stability and growth in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. Technical approaches to institutional reform 
and development following liberal-democratic and 
market economy templates were patently not working as 
intended and the spotlight was shifting to the political 
dynamic driving the approaches of partner governments 
and the interests closest to them. The political settlement 
concept offered a means both to better understand 
the complex development context and to calibrate 
development interventions in response to that context.
The adoption of ‘political settlement’ as a framing 
concept was led by DFID, and from there it spread to 
the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and 
Fragility and its members. In the policy analysis that 
emerged, political settlements were seen as positioned 
on the cusp of peacebuilding and statebuilding, which 
were interrelated and overlapping processes. The 
political settlement was characterised as both the circuit-
breaker for conflict and the platform for statebuilding: 
it established the conditions to end a conflict, and it 
provided the foundation of every political order.
The concept took off before its usage was settled, 
leaving its proponents to reflect on the absence of 
definitional clarity (Whaites 2008:7) or its still unfolding 
interpretation (OECD 2011:31), while nonetheless 
elevating it to the centre stage of statebuilding policy. 
Within DFID, the definition underwent minor 
adjustments over its first few years to emerge in a major 
DFID practice paper in the following terms:
Political settlements are the expression of a com-
mon understanding, usually forged between elites, 
about how power is organised and exercised. They 
include formal institutions for managing politi-
cal and economic relations, such as electoral pro-
cesses, peace agreements, parliaments, constitu-
tions and market regulations. But they also include 
informal, often unarticulated agreements that 
underpin a political system, such as deals between 
elites on the division of spoils (DFID 2010:22).
In a major policy guide, OECD characterised the term as 
referring to:
how the balance of power between elite groups 
is settled through agreement around the rules of 
political engagement. Political settlement may 
be (re)shaped by the outcome of a single event 
(such as a peace agreement), or it may reflect an 
ongoing process of exchange and (re)negotiation 
that extends over time where what matters is the 
conduct of key actors … Political settlement refers 
not only to the formal architecture of politics, 
but also to the web of political institutions — the 
informal rules, shared understandings and rooted 
habits that shape political interaction and conduct, 
and that are at the heart of every political system. 
(OECD 2011:31).
Despite the caveats around the unsettled usage 
of the term, there are significant common elements 
in the DFID and OECD definitions. First, political 
settlements are centrally about the organisation and 
exercise of power. Second, their forging is an elite affair. 
Third, they involve not only formal institutions but 
also the informal institutions that underpin a political 
system. These features recur in the usage adopted by 
other development agencies (AusAID 2011:13; UNDP 
2012:18).
The adoption of political settlement as a framing 
concept highlights the quintessentially political character 
of statebuilding and development more broadly. 
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Endnote
1 The concept of a negotiated settlement goes back at 
least as far as the 1945 UN Charter, although the term 
‘political settlement’ only became widely used from 
the late 1980s as the Cold War was winding back.
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Following this logic, it is the political settlement and 
not the design of institutions that is instrumental in 
shaping political and developmental trajectories. An 
understanding of the political settlement is thus essential 
for framing effective development interventions, for 
assessing the potential impact of those interventions 
on the processes of statebuilding, and for avoiding 
doing harm.
So far, the discussion of political settlements in 
development policy has been largely conceptual and 
normative. There are few empirical studies that analyse 
the character of the political settlement and how it 
affects institutional behaviour. Three recent publications 
from development think tanks (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2014; Golooba-Mutebi and Booth 2013; Phillips 
2013) begin to fill the gap, applying the concept to 
several African case studies. The next two In Briefs in 
this political economy series address the concept in the 
Melanesian context.
In Brief 2014/11 by Barbara and Connell explores 
the utility of the concept for informing more effective 
democratic governance programming in Melanesia. The 
authors suggest a political settlement lens brings with it 
a focus on three key elements of democratic governance 
which have often been overlooked by donors in the 
region: the potential of emerging elites to influence 
democratic politics; the realities of the distribution and 
exercise of power; and the impact of informal institutions 
on formal institutional performance.
Craig and Porter (In Brief 2014/12) use a political 
settlement lens to examine the prospects for stability 
after withdrawal of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands and potential points of vulnerability. 
Drawing on Dan Slater’s work on ‘protection’ and 
‘provisioning’ pacts, they suggest that provisioning 
remains the most important driver of pact formation 
and wider politics in Solomon Islands. The corollary is a 
preoccupation by politicians with accessing a share of the 
rents concentrated in Honiara to disburse within their 
constituencies. Recently the pattern has intensified, with a 
greater share of on-budget revenues directly disbursed by 
members of parliament. Donors also protect and provide, 
and their modalities shape the incentives of politicians. 
A central question is whether future provisioning 
arrangements will be adequate to avoid conflict relapse.
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